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1.  Introducr-on.
To the  extent  that  default  on  external  debt is  costly,  there  is  always  some
(low  enough)  price at which  a debtor  country  gains  by buying-back  some  of her
debt.  Similarly,  there  is  always  some  (large  enough)  price  at  which  her  creditors
gain  by  selling  their  debt  claims.  In  order  for  a  Pareto-improving  deal  to  exist,
these  two  values  must intersect.  Assuming  that there  is a range  of prices  for
which this is the case, the  next important  issue  is to find a mechanism  that
allows  trades  to take  place  at some  price  within  this  range,  and to  analyze  the
division  of rents  that emerges  from  the  use of such  mechanism.
Two debt reduction  mechanisms  have been heavily analyzed  in the recent
sovereign debt  literature:  market buybacks and  concerted debt  reduction
agreements.  Market buybacks have been characterized  as "boondoggles"  in the
literature  [Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989)],  because  they  are too  "expensive"  from  the
debtor  point of view.  This  outcome  is a reflection  of the  uncoordinated  nature
of  market  equilibria.  Debt  reduction  improves  creditworthiness  and  thus  leads  to
revaluation  of remaining  claims.  Faced  with a  buyback  bid, each creditor  has
incentives  to hold onto its  claim  unless  the  bid is larger  than the  post-deal
value of  debt  (Dooley (1989), Bulow and Rogoff (1989),(1990)].  Concerted
agreements  can overcome  this type of coordination  failure,  but they may be
difficult  to reach in practice,  principally  because of the heterogeneity  of
creditors.  If concerted  agreements  are voluntary,  exit terms  must satisfy  the
bank with the highest  reservation  exit  price,  which is likely  to be above  the
debtor's  reservation  price.
In sum, both market buybacks and  non-discriminating  concerted debt
reduction  agreements run into coordination  problems, and there might exist
Pareto-improving  debt-reduction  deals that cannot be  obtained with either2
mechanism. However, such deals can  be attained by discriminating  between
creditors.  In  particular,  the  lowest  overall  buyback  price  that  can  be achieved
is  attained  when  the  banks  with the  lowest  valuations  sell  their  claims  at their
lidividual  reservation  price,  and  the  remaining  non-exiting  banks  transfer  their
capital  gains  to  the  debtor.  But  coordination  of such  a  transaction  would  require
a large  amount  of information  and create  moral  hazard.
In this paper, we  argue that the co-called "menu approach" to debt
reduction  captures  part  of the  advantages  but  not  the  inconveniences  of  each  one
of these  mechanisms,  by combining  concerted  and  voluntary  characteristics In  a
first  round,  the  options  on the  menu and their  relative  pricing  are  negotiated
and the  creditors  commit  themselves  to choose  one of the options.  In a second
round,  each  creditor  freely  chooses  his preferred  option.  The  essential  options
in  any  sucb  menu include  an exit  instrument  and  a capital-gains-tax  instrument.
Given  the  relative  prices,  the  creditors  self-select  the  option  they  value  most,
allowing  the  debtor  to save ex-ante  on concessions.  In recent  menus,  the gains
made  by  the  creditors  that  do  not  exit  are  recaptured  by the  debtor  through  a  new
money "tax"  (see  Diwan  and  Kletzer,  1990).
There  are  a  number  of reasons  for  heterogeneity  across  creditors.  Perhaps
the  most important  ones relate  to implicit  insurance  subsidies  that  banks that
hold country debt receive from their regulators,  because these  also inhibit
transactions  on the  secondary  market  for  debt.  It is  weli  known  that  mispriced
deposit  insurance  (and  the  safety  net  in  general)  subsidizes  risk-taking  behavior
by banks-especially once a bank's financial  position  deteriorates.  Banks can
increase  their  value by taking  on more risk (for example,  see Merton [1977),
Sharpe  (1978],  Kareken  and  Wallace (1978),  Koehn  and  Santomaro  (1980),  Mitchell
(1986),  Penati  and  Protopapadakis  (1988),  and  Kane [1985]).  They  can  achieve  this
by increasing  their  leverage.  The  extent  of leverage  they  can  achieve,  however,3
is  limited  by  capital  adequacy  requirements.
Our  approach  concen,.ates  on  the  impact  that  transactions  in  debt  claims
have  on  bank  leverage.  Following  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Diwan  (1990),  we  show  that  the
application  of those  requirements  on the book values  of the banks assets
subsidize  holding  those  claims  whose  value  has  fallen  below  book.  In  effect,  the
ownership  of  such  claims  allows  banks  to  over-represent  their  own  capital,  thus
increasing  their  (real)  leverage.  As a result,  banks  that  sell  poor  quality
(inherited)  assets  that  are  treated  at  par  by  regulators  give  Ap valuable  "excess
leverage  rights".  These  rights,  however,  cannot  be  captured  by  the  buyer  of  the
asset  since  the  asset  is  "marked-to-market,"  ie.  its  new  bock value  is  now  given
by the  purchase  price.  In  effect,  the  commercial  banks  that  exit  the  lending
process  are  taxed.  This  creates  a  wedge in  valuation  between  sellers  and  buyers
of debt claims.  As a  result,  differences  between  banks are not entirely
intermediated  by the  secondary  market.
In  such  an environment,  banks  can  differ  for  a  wide  array  of  reasons,
including  differences  in:  expectations  about  the  future  prospects  of  the  debtor
economy  (Williamson,  1989);  extent  of  business  interest  in  the  debtor  country
that  can  enhance  the  value  of the  relending  option  (Sachs,  1989);  existence  of
aiternative  business  opportunities  that  encourage  exit  (Bouchet  and  Hay,  1990);
exposure  leading  to  exit  because  of  diversification  motives;  banks'  nationLlity
due  to  international  differences  in  the  tax  and  regulatory  treatment  of  country
debt;  and  in  size,  with  small  banks  exiting  to  reduce  fix  costs  associated  with
recontracting  and  with  monitoring  the  debtor  country.
These  considerations  help  explain  the  evolution  of policy  initiatives
concerning  the  debt  crisis.  Under  the  Baker  strategy  of  the  early  1980's,  banks
were asked  to  share  in the  cost of  reforming  the  HIC's  by sharing  in the  supply
of  new  loans.  However,  banks'  interests  diverged  over  the  decade.  The  concerted4
new  money  approach  began  to  break  down  as  some  banks  strongly  resisted  new  money
calls.  By  988,  after  the  completion  of the  Brazil  deal,  new  commercial  credits
literally  dried  up.  The  Brady  initiative  should  then  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to
reduce  the  tensions  within  the  creditor  group  by  tailoring  financial  instruments
to the  specific  needs  of banks.  In  particular,  the  Brady  Plan  allows  some  b' ks
to  exit  and  others  to relend.  Overall,  by  negotiating  on a menu  ex-ante  and
allowing  bank4 to choose  ux-post  the options  that they value most, the
internaticG:Yal  financial  institutions  (IFI'u)  and the commercial  banks  can
negotiate a  preferred burden-sharing  agreement without unsurmountable
coordination  problems.
An important  welfare  implication  of  this  scenario,  however,  is  that  the
menu  outcomes  are  only  unambiguously  preferred  by  three  of  the  four  interested
parties  in  the  lending  process:  the  debtor,  the  creditors,  and  the  IFI's.  The
agreement  developed  here  leads  to  maximization  of tax  advantages  and  deposit-
insurance  subsidies,  both  of  which  are  costly  to  creditor  c.ountry  governments.
Moreover,  the  predicted  outcome  of  the  menu  approach,  relanding  by  weak  banks  and
exit  by strong  banks  may leave  the  weakest  banks  in  a  less  secure  financial
position.  Therefore,  the  welfare  implications  to  the  creditor  country  government
depend  upon  the  degree  to  which  the  creditor  country  government  values  the  gains
to the  three  other  parties  relative  to its  own direct  costs.  These  include
decreased  tax  ravenues,  increased  deposit  insurance  subsidies,  and  a  possible
decrease  in  the  stability  of  the  financial  system.
In this  paper,  we formalize  the  welfare  claim  above.  In section  2, we
introduce  a sximple  model  of a concerted  menu  program  in the  presence  of tax
incentives  and  deposit  insurance.  We  show  that  the  "exit  price"  of  any  bank,  the
price at  which the  bank  would sell  its  debt to the  debtor  nation, is dependent
upon  the  composition  of  the  "non-tradable"  equity  in  the  bank's  asset  portfolio.5
Section 3 then derives the equilibrium  level of exit and new money for a
distribution  of creditors fv ing a given menu program,  and it also derives
comparative  static  results.  Section  4 confronts  tie  problem  faced  by the  debtor
nation:  subject  to  institutional  and  budgetary  constraints,  what is  the  "optimal
menu"  in terms  of achieving  both new  money  extensions  and  reduction  of the  old
debt  burden?  We show that  the  optimal  menu includes  some  positive  level  of  debt
repurchase  in almost  all cases.  This result  is obviously  of importance  to the
debate that buybacks are undesirable,  since the model shows that they are
desirable  within the context  of a concerted  menu prograv.  Section 5 provides
evidetnce  which  backs this  claim,  through  examination  of the  recent  Mexican  and
Philippines  menu deals.  Finally  section  6  provides  some  conclusions  and  explores
opportunities  for future  research.
2. The  Model.
2.1  The Decision  Problem  of a Representative  Bank.
The  model is two-period.  Banks  contain  a portfolio  of loans  AJ, in  which
there  are  m types  of  assets,  denominoted  al through  a.  where  a/  represents  the
book  value  of  the  claims  of  bank  j  on  asset  i  upon  matur.ty  given  zero  default.
Asset  a, is  assumed  to represent  loans  to the  debtor  nation.  All assets  mature
in  period  2. In period  1,  some information  concerning  the  value  underlying  each
asset  is  assumed  to  have  already  accrued  to  the  market.  The "fair-market"  value,
ie.  the  discounted  stream  of  expected  payments  accruing  from  a  dollar's  worth  of
asset  i  in  period  1,  p1. 1, is equal  to:
P,i  isk  re()  R  i  o  p  t
where A  is a stochastic  market  risk parameter,  Xel0,11  R  is one plus the6
nominal interest rate charged on asset  i, and  X  is  the current market
information  set, X  -(iul  where  w  is  the  realization  of  first-period  information
concerning  the  value  of asset  i, 1 G)e[O,1i  . X  is  know-a  by all  agents  in period
1,  as  are  the  density and  distribution functions of  1,  f(A)  andF(A)
respectively.  w,  can be considered period-zero  asset-specific  risk whileA
represents  remaining  market  risk common  to all  assets.
In the  absence  of any  buyback  program,  the  value  of bank  j  in  period  1 if
it  holds all of its  assets  to maturity,  WrlJ(AJ)  I  is equal to the  value of its
assets  minus its  liabilities,  or:
A  (  )(1  t  ') [  E  [a/ARfl  - §JRJf(A)  dl.  (2)
where  R represents  one  plus the  risk-free  ratG,  DJ represents  deposits  owed  by
bank J, AJ represents  the  maximum  realization  of A for  which  bankruptcy  would
result  for  bank j,  given  ,  and tJ  represents  the tax  rate faced  by bank j.Al
can  be shown  to satisfy  XJ  DIR/I  Ca/R".
The fact  that  deposits  earn  the  risk-free  rate  in  equation  (2)  stems  from
the  assumption  that  complete  deposit  insurance  exists.  For  simplicity,  we assume
fixed  premia,  which  we set  to  zero  without  loss  of generality.  The  value  function
in  equation  (2)  is then  a  combination  of "firm-contributed  equity"  (Kane  (1989)]
and  the  government  influence  on  equity  values  via  taxes  and  the  depos-t  insurance
'Having  asset-specific  remaining  risk  woL!d  retain  the  qualitative  results
here,  but  would  introduce  new sources  of heterogeneity  across  banks,  due to the
diversification  properties  of asset 1. For simplicity,  we do not pursue this
potential  complication  here.7
subsidy.
Let A 1 a  E  A/pa,  the  period.  1 fair value of the assets  of bank j, and
defina  kj a  l-D}  as the  period  1  capital-asset  ratio  (CAR)  of  bank  j,  and  letrc
represent  the  tax  gains  from  realizing  market  asset  losses  in the  first  period,
(  '(  R-1)  eltJ  (U -pl*),  where el  represents  the  dollar  sales  or "exit"  of  bank
j from  asset i.  We can then  state  the  following  Lemma:
LEMMA 1:  The value  of a bank  j  in  period  1 Is equal to the  sum of the  market
value  of Its  assets  minus Its  liabilities  plus the "non-tradable"  component  of
Its  asset  value In  non-bankruptcy  states:
vJ(AJ)  (-  -tJ)  EA 1 - D} + slj  *  (3)
vhere all,  Is equal  to:
5171.  1  +  T(4)
and yi  represents  the  deposit-insurance  subsidy  which  equals:
Y,  - (I  - t  )  fj [ (1  - kJ)  R  f  1](A)  dA(5
where 4 *  (1  k 1l)  ,
The proof is in the  appendix.  It can be seen in equation-.  (5) that the
deposit-insurance  subsidy  is decreasing  in  bank CAR's,  ie.  it is increasing  in
bank leverage. This fact is well-documented  in the literature,  as is the
conclusion that  in  the  presence of  fixed-premium deposit  insurance, a8
capital-adequacy  requirement  is  necessary  to  limit  bank  leverage.
Banks  do  face  minimum  CAR  requirements.  With  risk-neutral  creditors,  the
CAR requirement  will always  be binding  in equilibrium  in period  0  These
requirements,  however,  are  placed  on  the  "book-value"  of  bank  assets.  Given  the
realization  of  '),  the  market-value  capital-asset  ratio  will  differ  from  its  book
value  when  assets  have  not  been  "marked-to-market."  With  fixed-premium  deposit
insurance,  and  given  that  banks  are  not required  to "mark-to-market,"  their
optimal  response  is  to  mark  positive,  but  not  negative,  as its  to  market.  This
strategy  allows  the  banks  to  inci.o.se  their  tru,e  market  leverage  above  that  which
would  be allowed  by the  CAR requirement.  In particular,  we assume  that  the
realization  of ,, the  first  period  shock  concerning  the  debtor  nation  loan,  is
below  its  expected  value.
The disparity  in realizations  of bank portfolio  values  leaves  banks
relatively  "strong"  or  "weak."  The  true  market  value  of  the  bank  capital-asset
ratio  will  equal  kC 1 ,  as  defined  above,  which  will  lie  below  k, the  required
book-value  CAR  for  all  banks.  Banks  with  high  shares  of  poorly-performing  assets
in  their  portfolios  will  then  be  ralatively  "weak"  ie.  have  lower  market  CAR's
in  period  1  than  banks  with  small  levels  of  poorly-performing  assets,  and  stand
to  lose  relatively  rore  from  a reduction  in  the  deposit-insurance  subsidy.
While  failing  to  mark  poorly-performing  assets  to  market  increases  the
magnitude  of  the  deposit-insurance  subsidy.  the  existence  of  bank  tax  liabilities
gives  banks  the  opposite  incentive.  Marking  a  poorly-performing  asset  to  market
can  hasten  the  tax  write-off  associated  with  the  loss  experienced  on  that  asset.
The  present  value  of the  tax liability  of  bank  j  can  then  be reduced  by the9
portion  of losing  assets  which  are sold early,2
2.2  "Exit  Ptices"  of a Representative  Bank.
When choosing  the amount  of debt to sell back to the  debtor  nation,  an
exiting  bank will obviously  need to consider  the impact  of the  buyback  program
on  the  resulting  value  of  remaining  debt.  The  recent  literature  on  sovereign  debt
has made it clear that due to the absence  of legal  restrictions  on default,
sovereign  borrowers  only  service  debt  when the  value  of  debt  service  exceeds  the
value  of default.  The relationship  between the  stock  of debt and its  value is
controversial,  and  has  even  been  argued  to  be  negative,  as  in  the  "debt  overhang"
literature.  However,  we follow  the mainstream  arguments  by assuming  tlat the
present  v.Iue  of expected  debt  service  is an increasing  and  conc;ave  function  of
the  nominal  outstanding  debt burden 8., r0c)  ,  f'(8t)  >  0 and f"(8.)  <  0.  This
implies  that the total "fair-market"  value of debt is increasing  in nominal
outstanding  debt,  but its  value per-unit  is decreasing.
Let  pb  be the  price  paid  in the  buvhack  program  and  a  be total  expenditure
on the  program.  The  program  will raise  the  fair-market  value  of remaining  debt,
Pi, I  to  p2, 1 where P2,  f  f(62)/8,  and 62  - -l  _ (i/pb) ,  As  suggested in the
literature  [Bulow  and Rogoff (1990)1,  it can be seen that a  straight  buyback
would  in  this  case  increase  the  total  tradable  value  of  creditor  assets,  sircepb  a P21
is a condition  for  creditors  to sell  assets  to debtors.
Diwan  and  Kletzer (1990)  show that the  transfer  given  to creditors  shown
in  the  repurchese  above  can  be recovered  through  a  par  new-money  requirement.  The
2Qf course, the tax liability  is also increased  wher.  gains are realized
early  by selling  on the secondary  market  at  higher  than  purchase  prices.  Since
we assume  for  simplicity  that  the  banks  only  consider  selling  the  sovereign  debt
asset,  this  complication  does  not  enter  here,  although  it  would  change  no  results
of the  model.10
logic  is that the capital  gain accruing  to non-exiting  banks can be recovered
through a new money requirement  based upon the residual exposure of banks
subsequent  to th  buyback.  This  new  money  requirement  "taxes"  the  capital  gains
accruing  to banks retaining  claims on the debtor  nation, since  new money is
issued  at par. We therefore  define  a "menu"  as a combination  of an exit price
pb  and  new  money  requirement,  n. Banks  with remaining  claims  must  extend  a  new
loan  of n  per dollar  of remaining  claim.  We denote  by N the total  stock  of new
money  extenAIed.
With  the  introduction of  "non-tradable" components to  bank  asset
portfolios,  the impact  of asset sales  on these  components  affect  the terms  at
which  banks  would  be willing  to sell  their  debt  claims.  Since  all  creditors  are
below  their  required  CAR,  a sale of LDC  debt  would require  a reduction  in bank
leverage  and  hence  a  reduction  in  the  deposit  insurance  subsidy.  However,  the  tax
implications  go in the other direction,  as banks may prefer to hasten the
realization  of capital  losses.
Consider  the  decision  problem  of  a  bank  faced  by some  menu  program  (p  b,  n}.
Since  banks  are forced  to mark discounts  to  market,  selling  debt results in  a
loss in the deposit-insurance  subsidy  due to their leverage  decrease, and a
decrease  in the  present  value of their  tax  liability.  Demirguc-Kunt  and Diwan
(1990)  have  shown  in  a  model  with  deposit-insurance  that  banks  which  choose  exit
will choose  to do so completely.  This leads  to Lemma  2:
LEMMA  2:  In the  presence  of deposit-insurance  and tax  considerarlons,  all  banks
which  choose  some positive  level  of exit  will choose  to exlt completely,  I.e.
choose  el  ali.
Lemma  2  merely  states  that  the  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Diwan  result  is robust  to
the addition  of tax considerations.  A proof is provided in the appendix. The11
intuition  behind  this  result  is  that  the  benefits  of  early  tax  write-downs  are
linear  in e/, as are the gains  from the sale  of debt.  On the  other hand, the
marginal  cost  of  exit  is  decreasing  in  el  , so  that  if  a  bank  chooses  any  level
of  exit,  it  will  choose  to  exit  completely.
Given  that  exiting  banks  choose  complete  exit,  the  value  of  exiting  banks
subsequent  to  the  buyback  will  be:
v2(AJ,pb,n)  - (1-tJ)  [A 2 +  pba  I  - DJ]  + s2j  . (C
where  A2J,  is  the  market  value  of  the  bank's  portfolio  of  assets  2  through  m and
sa" is  the  "non-tradable"  component  of  bank  equity  subsequent  to  the  buyback,
which  satisfies:
sa  Y2  +  tja1(1_,p6).  (7)
We assume  all individual  banks take  p2l as given,  according  to the
equilibrium  outcome  described  below.  This  leads  to  the  first  proposition:
PROPOSITION  1:  For any  bank  J  wlth  an expected  post-menu  debt  price  of p2.,,  and
any new-money clalm,  n, there  Is a unlque  menu, (pbJ,n), whlch leaves  bank J
lndlfferent  between  selllng Its  old debt,  and retalning  Its claim  and Issuing
(1+n)a,J  In new  money,  le whlch  solves v2  @(pb)  - v2'.  Moreover, pb.i  Is
lncreasing  ln (1-k 1l)  ,  Inltial  bank leverage,  and  decreaslng  In t0, the  bank's
tax  rate.
PROOF:
The  value  of  a  bank  J,  given  that  it  chooses  the  new  money  option,  is  equal
to:12
v"f(A  ,n,p,.2 )  (1-t  )  [AZ  - DJ  + a1 tp,1  . (p[,1 -,)n)I]  +t.  (8)
where sa  is equal  to:
"a a  ()  +  tJ1(1+n)(1-pa9
From  equations  (6),  (7),  (8),  and  (9),  it  follows  that  for  any  n and  p,  1
bank  J  chooses  exit  at  all  buyback  prices  at  which  va*  2:  v2',  which  satisfies:
p.  >  (1-Rtt  )j  (p2, 1-1)  (1e.n)  +  (10)
Assuming  the  constraint  is  binding,  and  differentiating  with  respect  to t 1:
,  (R1)  (p*  -1)  UR  n) +  ;  +  - <  °  (1)
cit  J  (I  -Rt  J) 2  ~~a 1j  (i-RC  J)
Since &  CYa  <  0,  as  shown  in  the  appendix,  it  follows  that  the  impact  of
bank leverage  on the  minimum  buyback  price  of bank J  will  be  positive  if
aan  >  0.  This  is  also  shown  to  be the  case  in  the  appendix.
3.  Eguilibrium
3.1  Equilibrium  Exit  Decisions.
Although  each  bank  is  assumed  to  be  behave  as  a  price  taker  when  making  its13
exit  decision,  the  degree  of  exit  as  a group  will  have  an impact  on  p2, 1. This
leads  to  the  following  definition  of an  equilibrium  outcome  of  a "consistent"
menu  program:
DEFINITION  1:  An equilibrium  outcome  from a  menu pb,n),  consists  of a  group  of
q* exiting  banks,  a post-buyback  prlce,  Pi,i,  and "required-funding"  of a.
We  proceed  by  deriving  the  exit  decisions  of  individual  banks  taking  the
post-buyback  price,  P 2, 1, as  given.  We  then  show  that  this  post-buyback  price  is
consistent  with  profit  maximization  by the  individual  banks,  so  that  the  menu
yields  an equilibrium  in  which  individual  bank  choices  are  satisfied.  It is
convenient  to  number  the  banks  strategically.  Given  the  post-buyback  price  that
results  from  the  equilibrium,  pF,i,  and  some  new-money  call  n,  we  can  number  the
banks  according  to  ascending  exit  prices  by  equation  (10):
(pD.2l  S  (pb.2)  S  . b,  b.,  (12)
By  Proposition  1,  we  know  that  a  banks  with  greater  leverage  and  lower  marginal
tax  rates  will  have  a  higher  exit  price.
Define  a  "marginal  bank"  q,  as  the  bank  with  the  highest  exit  price  which
does  not  exceed  the  exit  price  quoted  in  the  menu  program,  ie.  which  satisfies
pb,  S pb.  This leads  to  the  second  proposition:
PROPOSITION  2: For any buyback  program {pb,n},  there  Is a unlque  post-buyback
price ,pi, 1, a  unique  "marginal  bank,"  q, such  that  banks  .1  through  q  choose  exit
while  banks  q+l through  Q choose  the  new-money  option,  and  a  unique  cost  of the
buyback  program,  a.
PROOF:
Suppose  that  the  post-buyback  price  is  expected  to  be  P;i,.  By  equation14
(10),  we can  number the  banks  according  to equation  (12).  It then follows  that
there  is a "marginal  bank,"  q, for  which  all  banks 1  through  q  have exit prices
at or below the  buyback price,  while all  banks q+l through  Q have exit prices
above  the  exit  price.  It follows  that  banks  1 through  q choose  exit  while  banks
q+l through  Q choose  the  new-money  option.  a, the  cost  of the  buyback  program,
is then  directly  attainable  (see  Figure  1):
a  .pb  ali.  (13)
The existence  and  uniqueness  of an expected  p2, 1 which is consistent  ex-
Figure  1
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post  with desired  bank  plans is  motivated  by Figure  1. Given  a  menu, fp  ,}, the
EE  curve represents  the relationship  between  the  expected  level  of p2,1 and the
number  of banks  which choose  exit,  derived  from  equation  (10).  This is clearly
a downward-sloping  line,  as an increase  in p2, 1 makes the  new money  option  more
desirable,  holding  all else constant.  Against  this  consideration,  the  PP curve
demonstrates  the  positive  relationship  between  the  number  of  banks  which  exit  and15
the  resulting  post-buyback  price p2,1 ,  which  is equal  to:
f (len) £  l
1 +n  a,I  (14)
[(ln) S  a,I
where  Q is the initial  number  of banks  with  exposure  to the  debtor  country.
While uniqueness is clear, existence requires that the curves cross.
Consider  the EE curve.  Clearly,  when p 2, 1 is equal to zero, all banks choose
exit,  while  when  Fh,,  is infinite,  all  banks  choose  relending.  On the  other  hand,
the  PP curve  has p^,  being infinite  when all  banks  choose  exit,  and  equal to a
number  smaller  than  the  pre-buyback  price  when no  banks  would  choose  exit.  This
completes  the  proof  of Proposition  2.
3.2  Comparative  Statics.
Comparative  static  exercises  can  be conducted  relative  to the  equilibrium
above.  To simplify  the  notation,  assume  that  each  bank is atomistic,  so that q
is now a continuous  variable, with each "bank"  having the equivalent  of one
dollar  of  exposure  to  the  debtor  nation. 3 It  follows  that  the  amounit  of old  debt
reduction  will be equal to qe, and that the cost of the buyback program is
simply  equal to g  _pbq.  Given  Q original  exposed  "banks,"  the total  amount  of
new  money  coming  from the  buyback  program,  N, will satisfy  N  - n(O-q)  . The  net
first-period  cost of the  menu program  to the  debtor  nation is then (a-N).
We introduce  simplified  smooth  functional  forms  to capture  the  results  in
the  analysis  above.  From individual  bank  maximization  (13),  the  level  of exit  is
3  Abstracting  from  strategic  considerations,  this  assumption  can  incorporate
non-atomistic  banks as a group  of atomistic  banks  with identical  exit prices.16
decreasing  in  the  expected  post-buyback  price,  increasing  in  the  buyback  price,
and  increasing  in  the  "new  money"  requirement;  We  can  write  this  relationship  as:
q  u h(p 2, 1 ,pmn)  3  sO  ah zo  t-0  (15)
From  the  market  relationship  (14),  the  post-buyback  price,  is  increasing  in  the
amount  of  banks  which  choose  exit  and  decreasing  in  the  total  level  of  new  money,
p2, 1 - g(n,q)J  <o,  a  >c..  We  obtain  the  endogenous  exit  decision  as  satisfying:
q  - h(p  b, g(n,  q)  , n)  (16)
PROPOSITION  3:  Holdlng  n constant,  and  assuming  that  the  buyback  program  is
suffllently  funded,  an  Increase  In  pb results  In  an  increase  In  q,  an  increase
In  p2., 1,  an  Increase  in  a,  a  decrease  In  N,  a  decrease  ln  82,  and  an  Increase  in
(a-N).  Holding  pb  constant,  and assuming  that  the  buyback  Is sufficlently
funded,  an  Increase  In  n  results  In  an  Increase  ln  q,  and  an  increase  in  a,  but
has  ambiguous  effects  upon  p 2,,,  N, 62, and (a-N).
The  proof  of Proposition  3 follows  directly  from  equation  (19),  and is
demonstrated  in  the  appendix.
Perhaps  the  most  surprising  result  from  the  comparative  static  exercises
is  that  an  increase  in  the  new  money  call  may  actually  decrease  the  level  of  new
money  obtained  by  the  debtor  nation.  This  "new-money  Laffer  curve"  stems  from  the
fact  that  beyond  some  level,  increases  in  n  can  cause  sufficiently  large  levels
of  exit  to  decrease  N.
In the  next  section,  when  we confront  the  choice  problem  faced  by the
debtor  nation,  we  derive  the  result  that  the  debtor  would  never  choose  to  be  on17
the  wrong  side  of the  new-money  Laffer  curve.  Given  this  parameter  constraint,
we can  sign  some  of the  ambiguous  results  of Proposition  3.  In  particular,  since
on the  correct  side  of the  new-money  Laffer  curve an>0 by definition,  it also
follows  that  tr>O.
4.  The Optimal  Debtor  Solution
Given  the  equilibrium  outcome  faced  by the  debtor  above,  we are now in a
position  to determine  the "optimal"  menu from the debtor's  point of view. By
Proposition  2,  we  know that  a  unique  number  of  exiting  tanks,  q',  exists  for  any
menu  program  {pb,n.  However,  it can  easily  be established  that  a  number  of menu
programs  exist  for  any qo, each of which  have a unique  net first-period  cost,
a-N.  In this  section,  we find  the "optimal  menu"  from the  debtor's  perspective
in two steps:  First, we establish  what the optimal  menu would be from the
debtor's  viewpoint  for any ql, deriving  a frontier  of "best  menus" given the
value of q desired.  Second,  we confront  the issue  of the  optimal  choice  of q,
given  that  the  debtor  will  then  choose  the  menu  for  q  which  is  on the  "best  menu"
frontier.
4.1 The  Optimal  Menu for  any Level  of Exit
We constrain  ourselves  to the following  buyback  program:  1. The  program
must  be voluntary  ex-ante,  ie.  each  bank  must be at least  as  well off  under the
program as under the status quo.'  2. The program is concerted ex-post, therefore
no  banks  can  shirk  on the  mutually-agreed  upon terms.  3.  The  debtor  is  precluded
4Cases where individual  banks had bargaining  power miight  allow them to
restrict  the  set  of "acceptable  deals"  beyond  the  criteria  of leaving  the  banks
whole.  This strategic  complication  is left  for  future  research.  However,  while
this complication  would change the shape of the menu "frontier,"  as defined
below,  the  optimal  debtor  strategy  given  this  frontier  would remain  the  same.18
from discriminating  across  banks in either  buyback  prices  or relending  terms.
We assume that  the  debtor  has a  very simple .tility  function:
U  =  u(cl,  C2 )
cl  =  E-a+N  (17)
C2 - 1i  (82)
where  E  is  the  first  period  endowment,  lu  >O(,  1  <0,I1,2), and  x  <0  X  >o.
pa 1 C  5P8-a 2 '8
Since  the  program  is  voluntary,  the  Iowust  price  which  can  be paid to any
exiting  bank is that  which leaves  it as  well off as prior  to the  menu program.
For  any exiting  bank J, this satisfies:
n§2(1  -t J)  aij  4  (  1]  . (1
The  debtor therefore faces two restrictions  when designing the menu
program. First, he must leave all exiting  banks "whole,"  ie. satisfy (18).
Second,  he must allow  all  banks  who  wish to exit  at the  buyback  price to  do so,
ie. satisfy  (10).5  This  leads  to the  following  Proposition:
PROPOSITION  4:  For  all  possible  exit  levels  q, there  Is  a  unlque  equillbrlum  menu
program  {p  b n),  such  that  bank  q  Is  Indifferent  between  exit  and  relending  under
the  menu  program,  as  well  as  the  status  quo.
PROOF:
Suppose  that  we rank the  banks  according  to their  exit  prices  in  equation
5Note  that  these  two  conditions  combine  to  require  the  all  non-exiting  banks
are left "whole"  as well,  so that they  will also  consent  to the  program.19
(18). It is easily verified that the ranking will be identical  to that in
equation  (12):  pb.i  will  be increasing  in the  leverage  of bank  j and  decreasing
in the  marginal  tax  rate faced  by bank J. pb-,  is  unique  since v 1 is  invariant
with respect  to  pb  while v2J is increasing  in  pb.
For  any  level  of  exit,  q,  suppose  that  the  debtor  sets  the  exit  price  topb.1
according  to  equation  (18).  Given  that  q banks  do exit,  the  cost  of the  program
will  be a _ pb.,q.  Moreover,  consider  a bank J  whera  J  < q. By definition,
pb.i  <  pb,a,  so  that  any  other  exiting  bank will also prefer  the  buyback  program
to the  status  quo for  an exit  price  which  satisfies  the  marginal  exiting  bank.
Given that q  banks exit,  then,  the  cost-minimizing  buyback  price is  pba.
The buyback  price  pb.  is consistent  with an equilibrium  menu if  banks I
through  q do  decide  to  exit,  and  banks  q+1  through  Q choose  the  new  money  option,
where  characteristics  of  bank  q+1  are  arbitrarily  close  to  those  of  bank  q. This
entails substituting the value  of  pb.-  from equation (18) back  into the
equilibrium  menu condition,  equation  (10),  and choosing  the  highest  value  of n
which satisfies  that  equation.
The solution  of n to (10)  must  be unique  because:
1 ad'j'
P2,1-1  +  (  )  0<.  (19)
If (19)  were violated,  it would imply  that  the indirect  gain from issuing  bad
loans, in terms of the increased  deposit-insurance  subsidy  and tax  benefits,
outweighed  the  direct  losses  from the  bad loans  themselves.  Since  the  value  of
these  subsidies  is in lowering  the share  of the losses  borne  by the  creditor,20
they  can  never exceed  the  entire  value of these losses.
Given the unique value of  n which satisfies (10), bank q would be
indifferent  between  exit and relending.  Second,  consider  a bank j  where j  >  q.
Since fY2<0,  banks  with exit prices  higher  than  bank q will also  have higher
[Y12-1  Yz )" values  of  - so that any  bank higher  than will also  prefer the  new- al  (1-Rt  i)
money  option  to either  exit  or the status  quo.
Note that  this  equilibrium  menu,  1pb,q,n*(q)),  is  also  the  "best  menu"  from
the  debtor's  viewpoint,  given  that  q banks  are induced  to  exit.  The exit  price,
PbII, is  the  minimum  that  would  be acceptable  to the  q  banks  which  were going  to
exit, so that reducing  pbQ  would violate the condition that the program is
voluntary  among  all  banks  who eventually  choose  exit.  Similarly,  the new  money
call,  n(q) ,  is also the  maximum new money call  which is consistent  with the
program  being  voluntary  among  all  remaining  banks,  since  for  all  banks  J, j k  q,
n"7(q)  s  n¢I(q)  where  n`(q) is the  maximum  level  of  n acceptable  to  bank  i  given
exit  by q banks.  Proposition  4 therefore  defines  a "frontier'  of optimal  menus
for  a given  level  of exit,  q.
The  rule of thumb  for the  debtor  is surprisingly  simple:  Given  any level
of exit q, the "best  menu," {pba,nlq),  is that at which bank q is indifferent
between exit, relending,  and the status  quo situation.  To characterize  this
frontier,  consider  what happens to pb  and  n as q increases.  Clearly,  pb  must
increase  as  q increases,  since  we are  movinig  up the  supply  curve  of  prices  which
leaves  the  banks as well off as under the status  quo. In addition,  since  more
banks  have  exited,  additional  funds  can  be called  for from  remaining  banks.  We
I21
can  characterize  the  effects  of  movements  along  this  frontier  according  to  the
following  proposition:
PROPOSITION  5:  For  all  menus  along  the  "best  menu frontler,"  Indexed  by  their
a  bq  an  >  bl  n  8(cc-N) level  of  exlt  q,  <  and  > O,  but  ---  and  -- Fq_  are  of  ambiguous  sign.
The proof is in the appendix.  While  the added  restriction  that  menu
programs  be  voluntary  among  creditors  allows  us  to  sign an,  02  is  of  ambiguous
T-,  - Zq
sign: -a. - -(i+n)  q  (,-q)  an,  so that when q is very small, or  an  is very
large,  the  outstanding  debt  of  the  debtor  may  actually  be  locally  increasing  in
the  magnitude  of  debt  repurchases.  This  surprising  result  is  ambiguous  because
removal  of  a  very  strong  bank  may  weaken  the  constraint  on  the  new  money  call
sufficiently  that  on  the  margin,  allowing  exit  by  an  additional  bank  may  increase
total  borrowing  by  the  debtor.
It  should  be  stressed,  however,  that  this  is  only  a local  possibility.  In
particular,  it  cannot  be the  case  that  8,>68  subsequent  to  the  debtor-financed
menu  program.  Using  (22),  one  can  see  that  this  condition  would  violate  (13)  for
any  bank choosing  the new-money  option  j  >  q facing  menu 4pb.q,njq),  since
p2. 1 <  p,1 implies  that  these  banks  would  end  up  worse  off  under  such  a menu
program  than  they  were  under  the  status  quo.
4.2  Optimal  Choice  from  the  Menu  Frontier
We  examine  the  case  in  which  the  debtor  funds  her  own  menu  program.  Her
problem  is  to  choose  the  utility-maximizing  level  of  q,  knowing  that  for  each  q,
she  will  choose  the  "best  menu"  {pb.°,njq}.  Since  any  menu  along  the  frontier  has
a funding  requirement  of a  - pb.q, the  "net"  first-period  funding  requirement22
of any menu program  is equal  to:  (a  -N')  - H(pb,9+n)q]  -no.  We can therefore
characterize  the  debtor's  problem  as that  of choosing  an  optimal  q' from  the
menu  frontier  which  maximizes  the  debtor's  utility.  Since  we  know  that  a-N  is
not  monotonic  in  q,  both  local  and  global  maximization  criteria  will  have  to  be
considered.  This  leads  to  the  following  proposition:
PROPOSITION  6: For  all potential  menus  along  the  frontler,  (pb*,nlvq),  q 0 ,
where  qg Is the  level  of  exlt  obtained  In the  "optimal  menu,"  {P*,n0iq*,  if
there  exists  a  q1 wlth  E  frontIer  menu  of {pb,,  n|q  such  that(a-N1q 1)5(a-NJqo)
and  (821q 1)  S  ( 6a2qo)  or If:
.ga  (Q-q)  +  (1+n)  + p.  q  -
where  /  .
The  proof  is  in  the  appendix.
Two  characteristics  determine  the  desirability  of  increasing  q:  First,  the
smaller  is  q,  the  more  likely  is  the  change  in  transfers  to  be  positive.  Second,
the  more  different  is  bank  q than  bank  q+l,  the  larger  is  the  gain  in  new  money
attainable  by letting  bank  q  exit.  It  is  in  terms  of  this  second  gain  that  menu
programs  can  be  understood  to  facilitate  discrimination  by  the  debtor.  The  debtor
nation  can  call  for  greater  new-money  extensions  from  banks  with  higher  exit
prices  by  allowing  banks  with  low  exit  prices  to  exit.
Some  conclusions  stem  from  these  observations.  First,  large  buybacks  may
be less  desirable  than  a small  buybacks,  since  large  buybacks,  by  lowering  the
bankruptcy  risk  of  the  creditor,  will  decrease  the  deposit  insurance  subsidy.
Second,  the  condition  in  Proposition  6  is  more  likely  to  be  positive  the23
larger  is  an.,  since  a given  level  of exit allows  for  a larger  new-money  call.
In the  appendix,  it is  shown  that  n  is increasing  in I HO(8 2)  This is  due to
aq  aq
the  fact  the  greater  is the  response  in  prire  to the  exiting  banks,  the  greater
is the  amount  of new  money that  can  be called  for from  remaining  banks.
It follows that inrereasing  pb  and inducing  greater  exit will be more
desirable  the larger  is the rise in the resulting  exit price.  This  result  is
interesting  because  it  does  not  conform  with  the  "conventional  wisdom"  concerning
the desirability  of buybacks  adopted from Bulow and Rogoff (1990). In their
analysis,  buybacks  are  considered  undesirable  because  they lead  to an increase
in  price,  and  therefore  a transfer  from  debtors  to  creditors.  In  our  model,  when
debtors  have the ability  to recover the transfer  through  increased  new money.
calls,  the  potential  gains  from  repurchasing  debt  is  actually  increasing  in the
impact  of  debt  repurchases  on  the  exit  price.  The  reason  for  this  discrepancy  is
that debtors  use exit in a menu program to facilitate  discrimination  across
creditors,  even though they would prefer not to repurchase  debt from any
individual  creditor.  Since  the  ability  to discriminate  across  banks is  greater
the  steeper  is  the  schedule  of  bank  exit  prices,  the  debtor  actually  will  choose
a larger  level  of  debt  reduction  the  larger  is  the  expected  increase  in  the  post-
buyback  price.
5.  Recent Experiences  with EuXback  Deals  and  Menu Programs
Following  the  onset  of the Brady  plan,  several  menu driven  "deals"  have
been negotiated.  The first  deal  with the  Philippines  had only two  options;  the
following  one  with  Mexico  had three;  and the  following  deals  had three  or more24
options  (Costa-Rica,  Venezuela,  Chile,  Uruguay,  Morocco). 6 Below,  we review  the
Philippines  and  Mexico  deals  of 1989-90.  We show  that  in  both cases,  the  overall
buyback  price  was well under the  average  ex-ante  price  of debt. In the  case of
Mexico,  we contrast  the  terms  of the  menu-driven  debt-reduction  of 1990  with  the
pure  buyback  of 1987 (the  J. P.  Morgan  deal).  We also  discuss  evidence  different
types  of  banks  received  different  terms  under  the  menu  programs,  indicating  that
some  level  of discrimination  by creditor  type  was achieved.
5.1  The Philippines  Deal
The  Philippines  and  its  commercial  creditors  agreed  in September  1989  that
the  Philippines  would  repurchase  $1.3  billion  of face  value debt at a price  of
50 cents (the  average  past year secondary  price),  and that the remaining  banks
would  provide  $715  million  of new  money (at  Libor+7/8  percent  with 7.5  years of
grace  and  15  years  of  maturity;  disbursed  in  three  tranches)  and  would  reschedule
(and  reprice)  debt outstanding  (leading  to  annual  contractual  interest  savings
of $.6 million).  The buyback took  place  on January  3, 1990.  Of the new loans,
about  $600 million  has been disbursed  so far,  and the third  tranche  awaits  an
agreement  with the  IMF on a new program.
It is quite easy to compute the  effective  buyback  price of the  program.
Besides  the  direct  price,  the  Philippines  received  new  money  traded  in  the  market
at below  par. The post deal  price fluctuated  around  54 cents.  As a  result,  at
least  46 cents of each dollar  of new money is a transfer  from the remaining
creditors  to the Philippines  (and  probably  more, since the price of 53 cents
includes  the  value  of "excess  leverage  rights"  to  the  marginal  bank).  So  overall,
the  Philippines  paid (1.3)(.5)-650  million,  and  it received  a  value  of at least
60f these  deals,  only the Venezuelan  had been consummated  at the time of
writing.  As these  deals  are  progressively  becoming  more  complex,  analysis  of  them
would  be  beyond  the  scope  of the  current  paper,  and  is left  for  future  research.25
(715)(.47)-336  million.  Per  dollar  of  face  value  of  debt  reduced,  the  Philippines
paid at most a net amount  of f0.650-0.336/1.3]-.24,  that is, 24 cents on the
dollar.  Clearly,  the overall  deal  allowed  for  a net buyback  price that  is  much
closer  to the  marginal  value  of debt than  to its  average  value.
Commercial  debt eligible  for  restructuring  and  debt reduction  operations
stood  at $11  billion  at the  end of 1989.  Thus, the  implicit  new  money  call  was
given  by: n-0.715/11-1.3-.07.  Banks  that  exited  got 50 cents,  and  they gave  up
both their  Philippines  claim  and  excess  leverage  rights.  The  marginal  banks  that
relent  got (1.07)(.53)-.07-.50,  since  the  post-deal  price  of 53 cents includes
the  value  of its  own  post-deal  excess  leverage  rights.  The  evidence  supports  the
conclusion  that the  marginal  bank  was left  indifferent  between  the  two  options.
5.2  The 1987  Mexican  Swap
In December  1987  Mexico  initiated  the  first  major  debt swap scheme  since
the onset of the debt crisis.  The new debt consisted  of 20-year zero-coupon
bonds,  with the  principal  but  not the interest  collateralized  by U.S. Treasury
obligations  purchased by Mexico  with its own foreign exchange reserves.  The
Mexican  plan essentially  packaged  together  two  transactions:  a  debt  buyback  and
a debt swap. If the  Mexicans  failed  to convince  the market  of the new bonds'
seniority,  the transaction  would  be just equivalent  to a debt buyback.
Indeed, this is what happened.  At the then current interest  rate, the
collateral  was worth  about 20 percent  of the face  value of the  debt.  With the
existing  Mexican debt selling  for  about 50 percent  of its  face value,  a  price
above  70 cents would  indicate  that the  market  accepted  some of Mexico  promises
for  seniority.  Of course,  if the  debt  were fully  senior,  it  would  have sold  for
a price  of almost  a dollar.
For the $3.67  billion in bids that exceeded  Mexico's  minimum acceptable
price, $2.56  billion of the new bonds  were issued,  backed  by $492 million in26
collateral.  When  account  is  taken  of  the  fact  that  the  interest  rate  on  the  new
bonds  exceeded  by  a  small  margin  that  on  rescheduled  bank  debt,  the  transaction
turns  out  to  have  reduced  the  present  value  of Mexican  obligations  by  almost
exactly  the  same  amount  as  would  have  been  achieved  by  a  straight  cash  buyback
using  the  same  amount  of  resources. 7 <
5.3  The  Mexican  deal  of 1989  .
Mexico  and  the  steering  rpm5mt,te,Q  f its  creditor  banks  negotiated  for
approximately  4  months.  On  July  23,  an  agreement  was  reached  on  a  package  that
covers  about $48.9  billion  in medium-term  and long-term  debt. It offers
commercial  banks  a  menu  of three  options:
1.  a  discount  bond:  a  30  year  bond  with  a  discounted  principal  of  65%  of
the  face  value  of  existing  debt  and  an  interest  rate  of  LIBOR  plus  13/16;
2.  a  par  bond:  a  bond  with  no  discount  but  a low  interest  rate  of  6.25%
fixed  for  the  lifetime  of  the  bond;  and
3.  a  new  money  package:  25  percent  of  exposure  (7%  of  principal  balance
at  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  and  6%  in  1990,  1991  and  1992),  at  an
interest  rate  of  LIBOR  plrs  13/16.8
The  principal  of  both  bonds  is  guaranteed  through  collateralization  of  a
30-year  zero-coupon  bond (US-Treasury  or its equivalent  in case of other
currencies)  and  18  months  of  interest  payment  are  guaranteed  on  a  rolling  basis
through  an  escrow  account.  In  addition,  both  bonds  include  a recapture  clause
which  stipulates  that,  in  case  the  oil-price  increased  by  a certain  percentage
in  the  years  1997  and  beyond,  that  the  creditors  would  share  in  the  increased
7Lamdany  (1988)  presents  detailed  calculations  of  the  Mexican  deal.
8Note  that  the  present  value  of  the  new  money  call  is  approximately  given
by: .07  + (.06/1.1)  +  (.06/1.1)2  +  (.06/1.1)327
revenue  stream.  The  agreement  also  contained  a financing  facility  contingent  on
oil  prices. 9
In total  an amount  of $7  billion  have  been  used  for  debt  and debt  service
reduction  (of  which  $5,757  billion  were  available  from  new loans  from the  World
Bank,  IMF,  and  Japan,  and $1.243  billion  from  Mexico's  own reserves).
The  choices  made  by banks  in  early  March  were the  following:  46.7  percent
of the  debt was swapped  into the  par  bond; 40.2  was swapped  into the  discount
bond;  and 13.1  percent  contributed  new  money.  Total  new money  pledges  amounted
to  $1.602  billion (for  a  period  of four  years,  with  a  present  value  (PV)  of  about
$1.35  billion).  Relying  on precise  estimates  of the  present  value  of the total
debt  reduction,  we can  compute  the  average  price  of debt  reduction  for  the  deal
as  a  whole.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  PV  of  debt  reduction  is  given  by $11.6
billion  [see  Van  Wijnbergen  (1990)].  One  must  add  the  $7 in enhancements  to  get
the  total  value  of the  reduction  in  obligations,  $18.6  billion.  The cost  of the
operation  was $7  billion,  implying  that  the  average  price of debt reduction  of
(7/18.6)-0.38.  Note that  prices  in the  secondary  market  were quite  volatile  in
the period  leading  to the Brady speech  and the beginning  of the Mexican  debt
negotiation,  fluctuating  between  35 cents  and  40 cents.
We can  now  compute  the  net  cost  of  debt  reduction,  given  that  new  money  was
available.  However,  the price of Mexican  debt was not quoted  after the deal,
because  trading  became  concentrated  in the  newly  created  bonds.  To extract  the
price  of Mexican  risk,  therefore,  we turn  to bond  prices.  After the  completion
of the deal, the discount  bond price stabilized  at 65 cents.  To compute the
9The  agreement  further  specified  a certain  number  of relending  options,  in
which the  banks  would  be allowed  to relend,  up to a certain  maximum fraction,
their  claims  to  Mexican  public  companies.  In  addition,  banks  participating  in  the
debt  relief  are  eligible  to participate  in  a  debt-for-equity  swap  program  of at
most $1 billion per year. The program would involve  public sector  companies
currently  undergoing  privatization  and qualified  infrastructure  projects.28
implicit  price of pure Mexican debt, remember  that each discount  bond is a
mixture  of pure Mexican  risk and  collateral.  Starting  from  a discount  bond,  we
get  a  unit of Mexican  pure risk  by stripping  the  18  month  interest  payments  and
the  principal,  adding  18 months  and  a principal  of risky  debt,  and  dividing  by
.65 to adjust for size. Thus, the  post-deal price of pure Mexican risk P  -
[65-24.278(1-P)]/65.  Solving,  we get  P-46.  Thus,  a new  money  lender  transferred
(at  least)  54 cents  per dollar  of new  loan (and  probably  more since  the  market
price  includes  the  value  of leverage  rights).  Thus overall,  Mexico  paid  at  most
7-(l.35)(.54)-$6.27  billion,  and  got  $18.6  billion  of face  value  debt  reduction,
implying  a net price  of (6.27/18.6)-34  cents.  The proximity  of the  net  cost to
the  average  cost is  due to the  small  size  of the  new-money  contribution.
The small  number  of  banks  which  chose  the  new-money  option  in the  Mexican
program can be easily understood  by focusing on the decision faced by the
marginal  bank. On the one hand, it could exit partially for 38 cents on the
dollar  and  a small  regulatory  cost (only  35  percent  of  each interest  payment  has
to  be written  off  each year).  And  on the  other,  he could  relend  for  a value  of
(1.21)(.46)-.21-.35,  plus  some  "excess  leverage  rights"  (remember  that  the  price
of .46  is computed  on the  basis  of bond  prices  that  under-represent  debt  value
for non-exiting  banks).  It is therefore  no surprise  that given the  relatively
large new-money call, only the very weak banks chose the relending  option.
However, since no data  exists for other hypothetical programs, there is
insufficient  evidence  to conclude  that  Mexico  was  on the  wrong  side  of the  "New-
money  Laffer  curve"  alluded  to earlier.
The results  of  the  calculations  in this  section  are  summarized  in  Table  1.
It can be seen that the  .1987  Mexico  deal, which we argue here can be better
understood.as  a straight  buyback  program,  ended  up with  a "net  buyback  price"  of
$0.50,  which is quite close to the  average  pre or post buyback  price.  On the29
other hand, the menu programs conducted  by the Philippines  and Mexico both
succeeded  in achieving  terms  below  the average  price.  The Philippines  deal  was
quite successful,  repurchasing  debt worth $0.50  at a net price of $0.24.  The
Mexican  deal  was relatively  less  successful,  due to the  small  number  of banks
Table I
Mexico  and the  PhiliRmines:  The deals  of 1987  and 1982
Country  Mexico  Mexico  PhilippLnes
Year  1987  1989  1989
Program  Buyback  Menu  Menu
Face Value  of  $492 Million  $18.6  Billion $1.3  Billion
Debt  Reduction
Pre-deal  (estimated)  $0.50  $0.40  $0.50
price
Buyback  price  $0.50  $0.38  $0.50
Gross  cost  of deal  $246  Million  $7  Billion  $650  Million
Face  value  of  0  $1.3  Billion  $750  Million
new  money (PV)
Implicit  new  0  $730  Millionf $336  Million
money tax
Post-deal  price  $0.50  $0.46  $0.54
Net cost of deal  $246  Million  $6.3 Billion  $314  Million
Net  buyback  price  $0.50  $0.24  $0.34
which  chose  the  new-money  option.  However,  the  ability  of this  deal to  obtain  a
debt repurchase below the pre-deal average price also conflicts with  the
predictions  in the  literature  for  straight  buyback  deals.
6. Concluding  Remarks
Two  main  results  emerge  from  the  above  paper.  First,  the  dominance  of the
menu  program  over  the  standard  buyback  and  new-money  options  is  quite  robust.  The30
market-based approach, which  does not  require debtors to  have  knowledge
concerning  the  portfolios  of individual  banks  proves  to  be adequate  in  achieving
a relatively  large  degree  of discrimination  with a relatively  small  number  of
instruments.  Obviously,  an increase  in  the  number  of instruments  would  allow  for
even greater  discrimination.  It comes as no surprise, then,  that more recent
deals  have seen a proliferation  in the  number  of different  instruments  in the
package, such as  discount and  "par bonds,". A  thorough analysis of  the
performance  of these  more complex  financial  instruments  which  have been  used in
market-based  debt reduction  deals is left for  future  research.
Once the  buyback is seen as a mechanism  for  discrimination  by debtors,
rather than an  instrument which  addresses a  costly "debt overhang," the
conventional  wisdom concerning  the role of buybacks  and the optimal level of
buyback  activity  is drastically  changed.  The debtor  uses the menu program to
allow  for  exit by banks which are relatively  less willing  to participate  in a
new-money  program.  The  benefits  of  debt  reduction  in this  context,  as  opposed  to
the  "overhang"  literature,  consist  of "buying  out"  banks  which  are  hindering  the
magnitude  of new money attainable  to the debtor.  Note that more debt may be
desirable  overall  in  this  context,  but  the  debtor  may  still  choose  to  repurchase
debt  from some  banks in order  to acquire  better  terms  with remaining  banks.
Second, the menu approach sheds a new light on some of the accepted
empirical  prescriptions  concerning the desirability  of debtor-financed  debt
reduction.  The Bulow  and  Rogoff  literature  has highlighted  the  point that  pure
debt reduction  is in almost  all cases  undesirable  from the debtor's  point of
view,  due  to the  capital  gains  which  accrue  to  remaining  lenders.  However,  once
these  capital  gains  can  be recovered  by the  debtor,  through  a concerted  program
with new money requirements,  the parameter  space in which one would choose a
large  level  of debt reduction  is exactly  reversed.31
With a menu program,  the role played by debt buybacks is not one of
purchases at bargain prices. Indeed,  as we argued  above, the existence  of a
deposit-insurance  subsidy actually  suggests that debtors will not face fair
prices  in the  secondary  market.  The  debt  buybacks  in  a  menu  program  are  designed
to facilitate  discrimination  across  heterogeneous  creditors.  As a result,  when
the  ability  to  discriminate  across  creditors  is  greater,  ie.  when the  elasticity
of bank exit prices  with respect  to the level of repurchases  is higher, the
debtor  will actually  choose  a larger  level  of exit,  contrary  to the  predictions
of the  simple  Bulow-Rogoff  framework  for  straight  buybacks.
Finally, our analysis  also highlights the inherent  limitation  of the
Brady  approach  to  solve  the  debt  crisis.  As argued  before,  large  debt  reductions
are  bound to  be expensive  to achieve.  But in addition,  menus  can impose  a fair
burden  sharing  between  exiters  and  non-exiters  only  to  the  extent  that  the  value
of  debt  after  the  deal  is  completed  remains  below  par.  The  menu  mechanism  to  debt
reduction  must thus be viewed as a method to alleviate a debt overhang at
potentially  good  terms,  but  it  does  not  seem  as  a  particularly  attractive  way  to
bring  debtor  countries  all  the  way to creditworthiness  and  voluntary  access  to
the  international  credit  markets.32
APPENDIX
I. Proof  of Lemma  1:
The  value  of the  deposit-insurance  subsidy  is  the  difference  between  the
bank's  cost of funds  under the insured-deposit  regime  and its  cost of funds  in
the  absence  of deposit  insurance.  In the  absence  of deposit  insurance,  the  bank
would have to compensate  depositors  for their losses  in bankruptcy  states.  A
representative  bank  j  would  have to pay R,J which  satisfies:
DR  3  (DR'([1  - F(AJ)])  +  WI  a/;X] f(X)  dIj.  (Ad1)
Substituting  RU3  into (2),  the  value  of an  uninsured  bank is:.
vJ(A  J)  - (-1)  (1-  t J)  I  (  EM (ial/lR)  f  (1)  - D}1 R) dA.  (A.2)
The value of the deposit-insurance  subsidy is equal to the difference
between V1J(AJ)  and v 1 (AJ)  . From equations  (2), (A.1),  and (A.2),  yf is equal
to:
V1  (1  - t) '[DJR  J  E  f(1)dX  (A.3)
R  f  1
alternatively:
1 {
Yr  - (1 t  f  - tR  If  -[f  Ca)  (A.4)
where AJ  ,  (  - kJ)
II.  Proof  of Lemma  2:
Differentiating  yd  with respect  to e yields:
W2f  U  J) aA2J  YJ2  +  A2  8  (-  ka)  f  l)  dl  +  ala  F(12)l  (A.5)
where F(A 2) - (1-k 2)-  p, which  is  equal  to  zero  by  definition.  Recalling  that
the  alternative  to a unit of exit is retaining  the  unit and lending  new money,
we can  derive:33
Te-  pb  (P.,  +n  1-)]  >  °
a(i-ka)  aAA 2 (1-k 2 )
de  -Te-  A  0.
Equation  (A.5)  therefore  reduces  to:
ay'2  aA 2
2
__ dy}  ,  _Sat  we  rf(A)dA < 0.  (A.6)
Differentiating  with respect  to e again  yields:
WyJ ,  _A 2 ' 2f(1% 2)  812  <  o  (A.7)
-0  ae
since  a)-2.2A2  211k2)
since  .fi  - _ a  4)  > 0.  Moreover,  the  cross-partial  is  equal  to:
8e8(1Y-'k 2)  8  A3(- 2 ),a)  < o  (A.8)
0)4  ~  ~  aa(  -*.  1  >0.) 
since  8(l-k)  r >  o
II.  Proof  of  Proposition  3:
Totally  dLfferentiating  equation  (16):
Oh
-?  - a-b  >  0  (A.9)
apb  _dh  a
Oa=aq  +  a  p?s..b  >0o  (A.ll)
aN  P  -n 2 a  < 0  (A.12)
apb  apb34
a 2 ,3  _  < 0  (A. 13)
8pb  apb  Opb
ah  a  ah
q "7i  > 0  (A. 14)
P  ,,  g8  q  a  a  (A.15)
&,  0pb>  o  (A.16)
,,  (Q-q_n)  - (A.17)
862  O  ~~~~~~~~(A.  18)
n-  (Q-q)  - (1n)
IV.  Proof  of  Proposition  5:
To be  on  the  frontier,  the  debtor  will  set  the  exit  price  for  any  choice  of  q
such  that  (13)  is  binding:
pb.q  a  Tq(p 2,,-l)  (len)  + B4+l.  (A.19)
where  Ta'.  and:
(  -Rt  0)
Bq - _E__  Y.___  (A.20)
(alq) (I -Rt  q)35
f(* 2 )
However,  by definition,  p2. 1 82  which implies:
f (E 1-q(2+n)  +Q(1+n)]  _  [pbq-Bq_  i  _  1  0  G(n,q)  (A.22)
(t,  -q(2  +n)  +Q(1 -n)]  I  Tlz(n+l) 
Totally  differentiating:
aG  8  (2  +n)(p2j-a  IL(.j 1 P, 1 aTg  (A.23)
aq  62  Tq(l+n)  T  L  Tq(l+n)a  0
when  P2, 1 >
d  (Qq)  (P2,l  Of  (-pbq)  +  BA.24) _ JY-  < 0. 
dFn  2  Tq(l+n)2 
3¢
an  a~O
So that 7Tn  - 4  >  o.  Differentiating  82  with respect  to q:
d8  -(24-n)  -1.  (Q-_')  (2 +n)  1
'2  -(2+n)  -1 +  O.  (i<°  A.25)
'-q  (Qq)  (P2. 3  a) +  (lRtq)^  (I v) 
However, a(a2q^U  is of ambiguous  sign:
O(a)  b  q+p,,+  (1+n)  - aQ_q)  (A.26)
By equation  (A.25):36
CaM2 _  pb.q)+  p  q  >  0.  (A.27)
V. Proof  of Proposition  6:
Consider  two equilibrium  menu programs  on the frontier,-  (pb.q,njq},  and
(pb4,nll,  where (8aI@) s  (821q)  ,  and [a*(q)  -N'(q)]  (&()  -NO(qj]  . It can be
easily  shown that while (c 1 lq)  - (c,  I )  (c 21q)&  (c 2lI  ,  so menu {pb.a,nIq1  is
preferred.  This proves the global condition.  The local condition is derived
directly  from  maximizing  (17)  with respect  to q, given  that the  debtor  chooses
the  menu on the  frontier  for  each  potential  choice  of q.37
~  q.
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